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THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE. By Stuart
S. Nagel. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press. 1969. Pp. xv, 399. $8.50.

Because Stuart Nagel's The Legal Process from a Behavioral
Perspective uses the tools of one discipline to analyze the operation
of another, it should prove highly valuable to scholars in both fields.
Lawyers can gain from this text a more sophisticated appreciation
for the developing behavioral science of law and for the application
of current social-science methodologies to legal research. Social scientists, on the other hand, can derive a better comprehension of the
policy capabilities of this country's legal "delivery system."
Professor Nagel, a member of the Illinois Bar, belongs to a group
of highly productive and gifted political scientists whose scholarship
has given significant new directions to the study of public law. He
and his fellow scholars-Jack Peltason,1 C.H. Pritchett, 2 Sid Ulmer,8
Glendon Schubert,4 Fred Kort, 5 and Joe Tanenhaus6 are but a few
of the leading names-insist that, since judges function as actors in
our political system, the role of the judiciary in the making of law
constitutes a form of political decision-making. Therefore, they believe that the actions of judges should be viewed, methodologically,
in behavioral-political rather than traditionally legal terms, even
though such actions may differ in style and process from those of
legislatures or executives.
To many members of the legal profession, however, the concept
of a political jurisprudence-a joining of politics and law-conjurs
up connotations that are far from appealing. "Law is a prestigious
symbol, whereas politics tends to be a dirty word," acknowledges
C. H. Pritchett, one of the founding fathers of the behavioral approach to judicial research. "Law is stability; politics is chaos. Law
is impersonal; politics is personal. Law is given; politics is free
choice. Law is reason; politics is prejudice and self-interest. Law is
justice; politics is who gets there first with the most. The motto over
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the portals of the Supreme Court building is, 'Equal Justice Under
Law,' not 'Equal Justice Under Politics.' " 7
The behaviorists nevertheless maintain that law is not so totally
divorced from politics. They view judges as participants in the
making of public policy, and therefore as part of the political process.
This behavioral perspective on public law, which has strongly developed since World War II, represents a reaction to what has been
somewhat pejoratively termed the "slot machine jurisprudence" approach to constitutional law. Thus, Nagel and his colleagues see that
judges do not merely discover law; they make law. Judges do not
merely follow mechanical precedents; they select those precedents
most appropriate to the ends that they believe reflect just and
socially desirable policy.
But this is not to say that contemporary behaviorists are merely
ideological descendants of the school of judicial realism-as first
propounded by Cardozo, Jerome Frank, Brandeis, and Pound. Because behaviorists also are strongly influenced by studies in sociology,
psychology, psychoanalysis, and the application of mathematics to
the social sciences, they seek a political jurisprudence which employs
empirical and quantitative studies in order to build testable theories
within a behaviorally oriented science of politics. To achieve this
goal, the behaviorists emphasize methodologies which point up the
interdisciplinary nature of contemporary public-law research, the
need for greater precision in the quantification of data, and the
employment of increasingly sophisticated statistical tools. Their
specific aim is to elucidate scientific relationships between the backgrounds and attitudes of judges and judicial decision-making, and
thus to develop general models or theories for predicting decisional
outcomes within a "stimulus-response" conceptual context.
In The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective, Professor
Nagel brings together more than twenty of his studies that utilize
this approach, most of which were published previously in various
legal and social-science journals. The book includes a number of
chapters illustrating the application of the behavioral approach to
research. Among the topics explored are the exercise of discretion
by various federal administrative tribunals in rule-making proceedings, decisional influences of state and federal courts upon each
other as revealed in Shepard's Citations, the influence of cultural
patterns upon the adjudicative processes, the extent of favorable and
unfavorable treatment received by identifiable groups of litigantsclassed by sex, race, age, and education-in the various stages of
criminal proceedings, and the relationships between "attorney characteristics" and courtroom results. Three chapters are devoted to the
7. Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in id., at 31.
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use of correlation-analysis methods, demonstrating how they can be
used to predict the decisional outcomes of cases involving criminal
confessions, reapportionment, and civil liberties.
Discussions of judicial "decisional propensities" include studies
relating judicial backgrounds-ethnicity, religion, education, and
ideology-to outcomes in criminal cases; methods of judicial recruitment-election or appointment-to party loyalty; and background
variables-including political party, region of country, and ideology
of appointing authority-to "conservative or liberal decisional directions" of seven federal regulatory commissions. A number of attitudinal surveys are reported which seem to point to a tendency for
judges with conservative responses "to decide for the prosecution in
criminal cases, for the business firm in business regulation cases, for
the party sued in auto accident cases, and for the employer in workmen's compensation cases" (p. 218).
In addition to these studies of reactions of the legal system to
various phenomena, the author has included several studies which
examine political reactions to judicial decisions. One such study
quantitatively measures congressional reaction to judicial review by
isolating and analyzing factors and issues that exhibit positive correlation with court-curbing bills. Another analyzes major editorial
reaction to "church and state" cases in order to discern variables
that might help to account for differences in response patterns.
Methodological problems encountered in systematically testing legal effects are further illustrated in a study which examines the
effects and impact of the exclusionary rule established by the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio8 on police, judicial, and criminal
behavior.
The material presented in the last two chapters is less directly
related to the author's central discussion of the applications of behaviorally oriented research methods to the judicial process. Chapter
24 contains a computer program for use by legislatures engaged in
redistricting. This program is designed to reconcile reapportionment
policy considerations-such as district compactness, contiguity, and
maximization of political interests-with the one man-one vote
imperative. Professor Nagel's last chapter, "Optimizing Legal Policy,"
attempts to employ "estimated correlation coefficients to determine
the relation of policies to goals and paired comparisons to weight
goals, and to determine the likelihood that a policy will be adopted"
(p. 360). Quantifying the "ideal" strategy options in the legislative
process in order to determine which set of policies has the greatest
chance of overcoming opposition forces represents an important
and practical research objective for social scientists. Nagel presents
a scheme for optimizing the probability that socially useful legisla-
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tion will be adopted, which he recommends "wherever it can be
applied in part or in whole" (p. 373) for use not only when the variables may be ascertained with quantitative certainty, but also when
they can only be estimated. The method is thus designed more as a
stimulus for further analysis of legislative problems than as a fixed
formula for deriving proven solutions.
Whether assessed from the perspective of the "newer" political
science or from that of the "newer" public law, Nagel's concept of
law-making and adjudication "as both effects or outputs and as causes
or inputs" reflects quite accurately the thrust toward a unified social science of law, that dominates contemporary behaviorist research and writing. One of the major merits of this closely reasoned
book is the author's success in combining his own numerous investigations and the research of others into one logically and systematically integrated work. This integration was especially important
because Nagel chose to include some of his earlier and possibly somewhat dated studies. The book's shortcomings, on the other hand, are
relatively minor. Broader comparative system-type approaches to
the legal process received only limited attention.9 Moreover, the
book's readability might have been enhanced had the conceptual
discussions been more clearly separated from the methodological
detail.
Despite these insignificant problems, The Legal Process from a
Behavioral Perspective offers a significant contribution to the discipline of behavioral analysis of the legal system. It constitutes a most
scholarly and articulate plea for the construction of more scientifically precise and empirically verifiable principles of judicial decision-making. There are, of course, legal scholars who continue to
express serious reservations about the adequacy of the behavioral
approach as a method of providing a meaningful guide to the subjective world of judges. For example, Professor Schwartz10 has urged
that a series of important questions, posed by Cardozo more than a
generation ago, should continue to challenge the building of reliable
predictive models, especially as the questions relate to a judge's perception of his judicial role under particular sets of circumstances and
conditions:
What is it I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information
do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them
to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to contribute? I£ a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it?
If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will
make a precedent for the future? I£ I am seeking logical consistency,
9. In this connection see G. SCHUBERT &: D. DANELSKI, supra note 4.
10. Schwartz, A Proposed Focus for Research on ]udidal Behavior, in
&: J. Tanenhaus, supra note 6, at 490.
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the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what
point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some
consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common
standards of justice and morals?11

It is doubtful that Professor Nagel would quarrel with the relevancy
of these questions, but he clearly believes that their seemingly subjective nature will not render behavioral analysis unproductive.
Rather, Nagel-more than traditionally inclined members of the bar
and bench-is confident that, as data bases grow and quantitative
research techniques become more sophisticated, he and his fellow
behaviorists will derive verifiable generalizations concerning the
legal process.
G. Theodore Mitau,
Chancellor,
Minnesota State College System,
and
Adjunct Professor of Political Science,
Macalester College
ll. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IO (1921), quoted in Schwartz,
A. Proposed Focus for Research on ]'udidal Behavior, in J. Grossman&: J. Tanenhaus,
supra note 6, at 490 n.4.

